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*physics* and the writing of the *Monadology*. The only important difference is in the introduction in the latter of a more artificial terminology.

Dr. Montgomery's little volume is adorned by a picture of the famous monument to Leibniz near the Thomas-Kirche in Leipsic, and enriched by a translation of the late Prof. Paul Janet's admirable *Introduction* to his *Œuvres philosophiques de Leibniz*. The type and paper are exceptionally pleasant to the eye; and altogether the translator and the publishers deserve the thanks of all lovers of stimulating thought and of all teachers and students of philosophy.

This book belongs to a series of inexpensive issues of philosophical classics. The series already includes Descartes's *Discourse on Method*, Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Berkeley's *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, Descartes's *Meditations and Selections from the Principles*, and Kant's *Prolegomena*; and other similar works are promised. The series puts the masterpieces of philosophy within the reach of all who may care to read them; and it places at the disposal of teachers of philosophy and of the history of philosophy a most valuable adjunct to their teaching, in the form of easily obtainable and inexpensive collateral reading to put in the hands of their students. In publishing these books the Open Court Publishing Company is doing a most commendable educational work, which deserves the heartiest encouragement from the reading public and from our colleges and universities.

GEORGE MARTIN DUNCAN.

Yale University.

**ETHIK.** Eine Darstellung der ethischen Prinzipien und deren Anwendung auf besondere Lebensverhältnisse. Von Dr. Harald Höffding, Professor an der Universität Kopenhagen. Zweite Auflage der deutschen Ausgabe. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers nach der vielfach geänderten und erweiterten zweiten dänischen Ausgabe, übersetzt von F. Bendixen. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland. 1901. Pages, xvi, 618.

Professor Höffding's *Ethics* has reached its second edition in both the original Danish and the German translation. The second edition does not in any essential point differ from the first one. Professor Höffding has adhered to his principles, which may be characterised in his own words as "an ethics of welfare." *Welfare* in his language is practically the same as the principle of Utilitarianism. Professor Höffding defines it in terms of pleasurable feelings, the weak side of which has been the subject of a discussion between him and the editor of *The Monist* (Vol. I., No. 4.)

Leaving alone the moot point of the ultimate principle of ethics, which in the present case has very little influence upon the execution of the work, Professor Höffding's *Ethics* exhibits sound judgment and a combination of a respect for such institutions as the State, marriage, the dispensation of law in the courts, etc., with

a progressive spirit that would not allow traditions to bar out the aspiration for improvement.

The whole material of the book is divided into three parts: (1) The Condition of Ethics; (2) Individual Ethics; and (3) Social Ethics, which last is subdivided into: (a) The Family, (b) Society, (c) The State.

The first part, "The Condition of Ethics," discusses the following topics: (1) Positive morality and scientific ethics; (2) Theological and philosophical ethics. Professor Höffding denies that the principle of authority is tenable, declares that philosophical ethics is independent of theology and metaphysics, and suggests that Christian ethics in its original purity is non-theological. In discussing the valuation which is characteristic for ethical judgments, Professor Höffding distinguishes between the motive which prompts the performance of a certain act and the criterion by which it is judged; the former is subjective, the latter objective. He discusses the principle of Aristippus, that every moment of life is sovereign, and shows how higher organisation leads to a complicated interrelation of the different moments. The same is true of the individual, which is interconnected with its fellows by sympathy, the latter being the basis of the ethical sentiment. The principle of welfare, which appears as the ethical ideal, is not merely subjective, but also objective; and the objective ethics is to be divided into individual ethics and social ethics.

Speaking of conscience, Professor Höffding says that where it acts as instinct the individual does not as yet know what it is about; where it acts as an impulse, the individual has a dim notion of its final aim; and when it appears as practical reason, it has created a clear conception of ideals and rules (page 76).

As to the question whether one can do more than one's duty, we are told that man can do more than may be demanded of him, according to a reasonable expectation; but he can never do more than fulfil the request of his inmost conscience.

In the next chapter, we become acquainted with six different definitions of freedom of will: (1) As an expression from causality, generally known as indeterminism; (2) As an absence of external compulsion; (3) As an absence of internal compulsion; (4) As an ability to do something, viz., the endowment with the faculty and power of performing certain acts; (5) It may mean the liberty of choice in case one has the option between two or more possibilities; and finally (6) it is used in the sense of a will determined by ethical motives. Professor Höffding uses the term *freedom* only in the first sense, and consequently adopts the principle of determinism; he claims, however, and rightly so, that ethics and determinism are not contradictory ideas. On the contrary, indeterminism would render every act of will accidental, and the ethical character of an act depends upon its necessary connection with the whole personality. Ethics is without vitality unless it be based upon determinism.

Evil, according to Professor Höffding, is isolation, which may have originated

in indolence or in defiance. It springs either from ignorance or from delusion. It is ultimately only foolishness, which by persistence becomes hardness of heart.

□ The least satisfactory part of Professor Höffding's ethics is his discussion of the theory of welfare; and it appears that he clings to his definition of welfare simply because the world of ethical beings is necessarily a world of feeling beings. Accordingly, feelings to him are indispensable, and being indispensable he takes the welfare of the feeling element, or pleasureable feelings, as its ultimate criterion. He concedes that lower animals, as well as a lower class of people, may very well be in possession of a greater permanent condition of pleasurable feelings. He explains it through a desire for progress, which has become an inalienable part of mankind. John Stuart Mill said: "It is better to be a dissatisfied man than a satisfied pig, and better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool." Professor Höffding answers: "I must, however, say a good word for the pig and for the fool; for the difficulty is greater than Mill thought. . . . Man cannot place himself in the position of the pig without ceasing to be man, and Socrates cannot identify himself with the fool without obliterating the Socratean needs. If a pig could attain to the full satisfaction of its demands, would not its happiness be greater than that of man, whose desires and ambitions can never be fulfilled? And the same with the fool. . . . It is a psychological law that the degree of a sentiment is determined by the complete condition of the individual; and he who has gained a fuller satisfaction of his demands has no motive to compare his condition with that of others. There must be different degrees of happiness. It will be as in Dante's Paradise where there are different degrees of bliss. . . . In Dante's Paradise, all endeavor and all evolution are past, but will that be possible everywhere, and how will the principle of welfare be applicable to a comparison of conditions of different beings, among whom each for itself will have the character of complete contentedness?" (Pp. 129-130).

The final explanation which Professor Höffding gives may be an explanation why, in a world the essential characteristic of which is progress, a perfect satisfaction is impossible, and how the ambition to reach higher planes becomes a part of our own being; but it decidedly does not justify the principle of welfare in such a sense as Prof. Höffding explains it, as a maximum state of pleasurable feelings; or it would, if his definition of welfare should be upheld in ethics, condemn progress as an immoral process which ought to be either stopped, or at least retarded.

Having discussed the general notions of ethics, Professor Höffding enters the field of applied ethics, which he divides into two parts: (1) Individual Ethics, and (2) Social Ethics.

Justice is the main virtue of ethics, and it comprises self-preservation as well as self-sacrifice. Self-preservation is not merely an instinct, but also a duty. Suicide may be either the result of a mental aberration, or a liberation from obligations; it comes frequently as the expression of a debilitation of the will; but Professor Höffding does not deny that suicide may be a right, and even a duty.

Self-sacrifice sometimes proceeds from love, and sometimes from generosity. Akin to it is the devotion to truth, which latter is limited only by the love of truth itself. Its aim is to make truth victorious, and therefore truth should be spoken only in such a form as to let it find ready acceptance. To express ethical opinions where they are out of place is barbarism or Phariseism.

In sociology, ethics finds its most important application, and social ethics is divided into three branches: (1) the family as based upon matrimony: (2) society, the free congregation of civilised beings, and (3) the State.

Professor Höffding is in favor of monogamy. He objects to free love as a mere excuse for fickleness. He demands the equal position of husband and wife, but he would not make marriage indissoluble according to the principle of the Roman Catholic Church. He touches upon the problem of prostitution, but does not enter into its intricate difficulties; he only claims that its prevalence cannot be explained as a mere revival of the primitive sexual relations; but he hopes that much can be done to improve conditions by giving women a greater scope of freedom, allowing them independence, and giving them a chance to earn their own living.

In his discussion of the place of women in society, Professor Höffding may be regarded as in perfect agreement with John Stuart Mill. He regards the emancipation of woman as a duty, and would also include the privilege of granting her all political rights.

As to the parents' rights over, and duty toward, children, Professor Höffding explains how the absolute power has been limited and modified, and how the State now exercises to a great extent the rights of watching over the physical welfare of children, and also over their instruction.

Society is based upon the recognition of the liberty of every individual. Nevertheless, the principle of liberty can be exaggerated, as was actually done in the eighteenth century.

The social question is a product of the modern development of society. It originates through the condition of having a smaller minority contrasted with large multitudes. In multitudes personality ceases to be considered, and it is the assertion of free personality which prompts to the ventilation of the social question. Professor Höffding recognises the existence of a dualism in the social order, which shows itself in a contrast between the classes. His investigations do not seem to touch the heart of the problem, and for all we know they may be better applicable to Europe than to England and America.

After a long discussion of civilisation, material as well as ideal, the civilisation of art, of religion, and the problems of State and Church, which of course has reference only to European conditions, and after a discussion of philanthropy (also ignoring the American phase of it), Professor Höffding descants on the nature of the State, which he characterises as compulsion. Whatever the State may do, it is throughout backed by the threat to compel obedience through the use of power.

The State originates through the national sentiment, and may be defined as "the organised people." One of its main functions is the dispensation of justice, which of course must not be identified with morality. Public opinion forms an important part in public life. The State has been defined as ethics incarnate, but on the other hand it has also been regarded as mere power. Höffding believes it to be the duty of the State to organise the life of the people in definite forms.

As to the constitution of the State, Professor Höffding prefers self-government, but although he recognises the preferences of liberty, especially of its educational influence, he grants that a free constitution implies dangers.

In his concluding chapter, he makes reference to Kant's treatise on perpetual peace, and he holds out the hope of its realisation, as Kant himself indicated, because it recommends itself to international commerce and to the very egotism of man.

Professor Höffding concludes his book with the maxim: "Be inspired only by great things, and be faithful in small things." P. C.

BEWEIS FÜR DAS DASEIN GOTTES. Den Gebildeten unter den Zweiflern gewidmet von *Dr. Paul Schwartzkopff*, Professor zu Wernigerode. Halle a. S. und Bremen: C. Ed. Müller's Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1901. Pages, vii, 118.

"To-day it is generally granted that there is no proof of the existence of God." With this exclamation our author starts and proceeds to distinguish between the untenableness of the old proofs and the unprovableness of the idea in general. He maintains that the former does not imply the latter, and declares, "it would be strange, indeed, if the creator truly played hide and seek in his own works."

Schwartzkopff offers four proofs of the existence of God: (1) the cosmological, which is new in the form in which he presents it; (2) the teleological, which contains some good comments on the significance of pain and death in the economy of life; (3) the moral; and (4) the christological. The last two are not new and appeal to Christians only.

Schwartzkopff accepts the Kantian distinction of phenomenon and noumenon, which he calls the thing and its cause. The thing-in-itself, being a cause, is endowed with causality which implies time, and the question arises as to the relation of God, the cause of all things, to the individual egos. Each individual carries in himself his world, but all individuals together agree in this, that they have their worlds in common which thus form one great universe. The universe is the sum-total of all the world-conceptions of the agents who exist side by side. Whether or not this common universe is possessed of an external reality in space is of secondary importance; it exists most assuredly as a common product. Now, the basis of this common universe, its soul, its cause, is the world-soul or the All-cause, and this is the God of Pantheism. But Schwartzkopff does not stop here; he finds it